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TERRORISM AND THE AVIATION INDUSTRY:
INSIGHTS FROM THE 1929 WARSAW CONVENTION
SPEEDY RICE*
SHANA FITZPATRICK**
I. INTRODUCTION
The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, (September 11) crippled the
domestic and international airline industry and its insurance carriers., Were
it not for government intervention in the United States and abroad, air
carriers would have been forced to shut down due to the insurance and
financial crisis. 2 The insurance industry cancelled policies, and then
drastically revised its offerings, exclusions, policy limits, and charges. 3
Because of this and the stated intent of the terrorist organizations to destroy
or cripple the economies of the West, the aviation industry now faces a risk
level not seen since its earliest days.4
Since its conception, aviation has established itself as one of the most
essential means of transportation and has expanded the global financial
market. The first strides were made in communication and mail carriage,
but as aviation progressed, people and shipments of goods could travel
greater distances in relatively short periods of time. In the late 1920s and
early 1930s, the industry grew at an exponential rate. 5 In a mere five years,
passenger carriage increased over 6000%, from 8679 passengers in 1927 to
522,345 passengers in 1931.6 Airplane manufacturing increased as
commercial demand soared. In 1930, there were roughly 800 local "air-
. Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law; B.A., Furman University, South Carolina,
1976; J.D., California Western School of Law, summa cum laude, 1986. Speedy Rice would like
to thank Sasha of Podgorica, Montenegro, for his assistance in finding resources in his beautiful
country.
. Research Assistant, Gonzaga University School of Law, J.D. expected 2003; B.A.,
University of Alaska, cum laude, 1999.
1. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Simon Romero, A Day of Terror: The Insurers; Reinsurance
Companies Wait to Sort Out Cost of Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at C6 [hereinafter A
Day of Terror].
2. Id.; Keith L. Alexander & Frank Swoboda, Deal Near on Federal Help for Airlines; $15
Billion in Grants, Loan Guarantees, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 200 1, at A3.
3. Mark Pilling, Industry Seeks Mutual Insurance Deal, AIRLINE BUSINESS, Mar. 1, 2002, at
]I.
4. U.S. Congress, White House Agree on $15 Billion Airline Aid Bill (Sept. 21, 2001),
available at http://www.aviationnow.com.
5. George W. Ball, Compulsory Airplane Insurance, 4 J. AIRL. 52, 53 (1933).
6. Id.
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taxi" services that utilized over 1000 airports around the country. 7
Individuals and cargo could travel long distances across numerous states
and borders. There were as many as thirty-eight companies responsible for
interstate air carriage of passengers, and approximately 8000 airplanes
supported the aviation industry in the early part of the twentieth century.8
As the aviation industry grew, the concern over liability risks intensi-
fied. In 1927, twelve individuals per hundred thousand passengers died in
airplane-related accidents, and five years later, the figure dropped slightly to
five deaths per hundred thousand passengers. 9 The relatively high number
of fatalities concerned industry experts. Accidents were not uncommon,
and the rise in air traffic litigation reflected this trend.10 In 1931, Colonial
Western Airways received an unfavorable $89,000 judgment when one of
its planes crashed and killed fourteen passengers." In a similar suit,
Northwest Airways was ordered to pay $60,000 when one if its planes
crashed and injured five people.12 Curtis-Wright Flying Service was also
found liable for $25,000 in damages for the death of a single passenger in
an airplane-related accident.13 These examples demonstrate that juries were
awarding substantial damages to injured passengers.
While the airline industry was showing signs of becoming financially
independent, there were still concerns from industry leaders that liability
risks would halt or substantially slow its growth.' 4 A string of well-timed
accidents, or a single catastrophic event with numerous causalities, was not
unrealistic.15 The resulting damage awards could quite possibly have
bankrupted vulnerable airlines and negatively impacted the new
aeronautical field. Furthermore, the standard of care in liability litigation
was unclear, and varied by country and jurisdiction.16 Shareholders, inves-
tors, insurance companies, and governments were apprehensive about finan-
cially backing the industry because of its unclear liability and regulatory
7. Fredrick B. Rentschler, Important of Uniform Aeronautic Regulatory Laws of the Aircraft
Industry, 2 AIR L. REv. 222, 223 (1931).
8. Id.
9. Id.; Ball, supra note 5, at 53.
10. See Ball, supra note 5, at 53 (discussing the death rate per airline passenger between
1927 and 1931).
11. Id. at 52 (citing Hagymasi v. Colonial W. Airways, 1931 U.S. Av. R. 7 (1931)).
12. Id. (citing Foot v. Northwest Airways, 1931 U.S. Av. R. 66 (1931)).
13. Id. at 53 (citing Williamson v. Curtis-Wright Flying Serv., 51 S.W.2d 1047, 1049 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932)).
14. G.L. Lloyd, Legal and Other Problems Confronting Aviation Insurance Underwriters, 1
J. AIRL. 543, 543 (1930).
15. Ball, supra note 5, at 53-54.
16. Fred D. Fagg, Jr., A Survey of State Aeronautical Legislation, I J. AIR L. 452, 452-53
(1930).
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schemes.17 These concerns echoed internationally.18 Commercial leaders
and aviation law experts theorized on possible liability schemes that would
balance the needs of the infant industry with concerns for consumer safety
and corporate responsibility. 19
As a result of these concerns, liability limits were proposed and adopt-
ed in the Warsaw Convention of 1929.20 The international agreement
reflected the Warsaw Convention's two goals: (1) to create uniform and
predictable regulations governing interstate air carriage that promote com-
pensation, and (2) to limit the large-scale liability threatening the young in-
dustry. 21 Under this convention, air carriers were able to limit their liability
unless they could prove all necessary and reasonable precautions had been
taken. 22 However, injured plaintiffs could obtain unlimited recoveries if
they could prove an accident was the result of an air carrier's willful
misconduct. 23
The economic growth of the twentieth century was inextricably inter-
twined with the development of aviation.24 This began after World War I,
when the rise in popularity of both private and commercial airline travel
started.25 In the seventy years since the Warsaw Convention was ratified,
international liability laws and their limits have been severely modified
with good justification.26 Sentiments and the financial strength of the
industry changed, and the liability limits imposed by the Warsaw
Convention were seen as unfairly deferential to the airline industry.27
Beginning in The Hague in 1955 and ending in Montreal in 1999, liability
limits underwent significant changes, and were finally all but eliminated.28
17. John R. Bullock, Jr., Note, Aviation-Liability of Owners of Airplanes to Passengers, I
AIR L. REV. 407, 407-08 (1930).
18. Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelson, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1967).
19. Id. at 499-501.
20. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, art. 22, 49 Stat. 3000, 3019 (1934) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
21. Domangue v. E. Airlines, Inc., 722 F.2d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 1984).
22. Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. 20.
"23. Id. art. 25.
24. See Bullock, supra note 17, at 407 (stating that "aviation is destined to have a profound
effect on the commercial life of the [United States]").
25. Andre Kaftal, Liability and Insurance -The Relation of Air Carrier and Passenger, 5
AtRL. REV. 157, 157 (1932).
26. Pablo Mendes DeLeon & Werner Eyskens, The Montreal Convention: Analysis of Some
Aspects of the Attempted Modernization and Consolidation of the Warsaw System, 66 J. AIR L. &
COM. 1155, 1156-59 (2001).
27. Id.
28. Tamara A. Marshall, The Warsaw Convention: A Cat with Nine Lives Walks the Plank
One More Time, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 337, 339-41 (2002).
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On September 11, the terrorist acts were domestic in nature and would
not have been subject to liability limitations even under the 1929 Warsaw
Convention.2 9 However, the domestic and international effect on the airline
industry was equivalent to the worst fears of the promoters of the Warsaw
Convention-a series of high-profile air crashes that crippled the industry. 30
It quickly became clear that without government intervention and
immediate assistance, including some type of a liability shield, most airlines
would not have the foundation to navigate through the months following the
attacks. 31 The federal government quickly passed aid packages that
included air carrier liability limits. 32 Air carrier liability limits were not a
new concept, but have been around since the fledgling stages of the aviation
industry.
II. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY IN THE EARLY AVIATION
INDUSTRY
Air carrier liability prior to the Warsaw Convention and other similar
conventions varied greatly in the United States and around the world.33
There were no guidelines to assist courts in assigning liability.34  In
addition, the nature of the industry itself precluded a common law tort
scheme directly on point. 35 There were comparable liability schemes in the
maritime and railroad industries, but the aviation field was a completely
new horizon. 36 The potential liability of air carriers was readily apparent,
and governments were acutely aware of it.37 Liability risks deterred
investors and opened carriers to possible bankruptcy. 38 On the other hand,
a recovery scheme was needed for injured international passengers.
29. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. 1 (providing that the Convention applies to
international transportation by aircrafts).
30. See Lowenfeld & Mendelson, supra note 18, at 499 (stating that the Warsaw Convention
was created to "enable airlines to attract capital that might otherwise be scared away by the fear of
a single catastrophic accident").
31. A Day of Terror, supra note 1, at C6.
32. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
33. William K. Coblentz, Limitation of Liability for Aircraft, 330 INS. L. J. 649, 649-52
(1950).
34. See id. at 651 (stating that the status of liability for aircrafts was uncertain).
35. Henry Grady Gatlin, Jr., Note, Tort Liability in Aircraft Accidents, 4 VAND. L. REV. 857,
859-60 (1951).
36. Arnold W. Knauth, Limitations on Aircraft Owner's Liability, 3 AIR L. REV. 135, 135
(1932).
37. Kaftal, supra note 25, at 160.
38. See id. at 159 (noting that aviation's early financial instability, which was caused by
unusually high liability risks, impaired the industry's ability to attract capital).
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Limitations on liability were adopted to achieve these goals. 39  With
liability limits, injured parties were ensured a recovery while the industry
was insulated from outrageous damage awards. 40
A. PROPOSED APPROACHES TO ASSIGN LIABILITY IN AVIATION
ACCIDENTS
Without international guidelines or common law tort theory, state laws
governing aviation accidents involved notions of strict liability and
negligence. 4' The continued development of the aviation industry greatly
affected the progression of liability laws. Early notions of strict liability
were slowly replaced with negligence theories. 42 Simultaneously, the
legislatures and the courts adopted creative systems of relief.43 Compulsory
insurance, liability limits, and res ipsa loquitur were the most viable pro-
posals.44 Eventually, liability limits gained international support and were
adopted domestically. 45
1. Strict Liability
Initial recovery schemes imposed strict liability upon air carriers for
injury to cargo, passengers, individuals on the ground, and structures. 46 The
early application of strict liability reflected aviation's "ultra-hazardous"
nature.47 Air carriers were strictly liable for injuries caused by aircrafts
under their possession or control regardless of the care exercised to prevent
injuries. 48 Injuries and property damage were not foreign to the evolving
aviation industry because air transportation was seen as relatively dan-
gerous and accidents were not that uncommon. 49 The frequency and gravi-
39. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 360-61, 384 (1873); Powell v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 164 S.W. 628, 641 (Mo. 1914); Coleman v. Pa. R.R. Co., 89 A. 87, 90 (Pa.
1913); Davis v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 67 N.W. 16, 20 (Wis. 1896).
40. LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL
HANDBOOK 5 (1988).
41. Gatlin, supra note 35, at 863. Strict liability is "[Iliability that does not depend on actual
negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make
something safe." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999). It is also called absolute
liability. Id.
42. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 520A (1977).
43. See Ball, supra note 5, at 56-73 (discussing different approaches taken by courts and
statutes to airline liability).
44. Id. at 66-72.
45. See 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2000).
46. Gatlin, supra note 35, at 860-63.
47. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
48. Id.
49. Gatlin, supra note 35, at 861.
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ty of accidents was too great a liability risk for society to manage. 50
Instead, social policy, and eventually legal policy, dictated that the industry
carry the burden for injuries caused by these accidents.5' Strict liability also
created incentives for the aviation industry to build safer and more
economic modes of transportation. 52 Holding the carriers responsible
stimulated research and development, which benefited both consumers and
producers. 53
However, a distinction was quickly made between ground damages and
injuries sustained while taking off, landing, or in flight.54 The ultra-
hazardous nature of the aviation industry used to justify strict liability for
injuries sustained from an airplane-related cause was highly debated after
its characterization in the Restatement of Torts.55 Courts shied away from
the use of strict liability in cases of passenger injury.56 Instead, strict
liability was limited to suits alleging ground damage.57
Safety greatly improved with the introduction of the Douglas DC-3 and
subsequent aircrafts.58 Air carriage became more dependable and accidents
were significantly reduced. 59 However, in respect to ground damage, the
courts continued to place the risk of liability on the industry. 60 Therefore,
the participants in the flight assumed some liability risk, but extraneous
third parties on the ground were still shielded.61 Those in possession and
control were in the best position to mitigate the risk, and therefore, bore the
50. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmt. c. Financially, individual carriers were in a better
position to pool their assets and provide recovery than individual parties. Id.
52. See William M. Allen, Limitations of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers, 2 J. AIR. L.
325, 327-33 (1931) (stating liability limits allow carriers to be irresponsible and decrease the
desire to avoid accidents).
53. Id.
54. See J. Wolterbeek Muller, The C.I.T.E.J.A. and Liability Toward Third Persons on the
Surface, 4 J. AtR L. 235, 235-36 (1933) (noting that at a meeting of the International Technology
Committee of Aerial Legal Experts, injuries to passengers and injuries to third persons on the
ground were discussed as mutually exclusive).
55. 41 A.L.I. PROC. 465-74 (1964); 42 A.L.I. PROC. 331-58 (1965).
56. Lincoln H. Cha, The Air Carrier's Liability to Passengers in Anglo-American and
French Law, 7 AIR L. REV. 154, 160 (1936) (citing Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc.,
1931 U.S. Av. R. 205 (1931)).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A note (1977).
58. The DC-3's safety record was better than that of most airplanes, primarily because of its
great structural strength and efficient single-engine performance. Smithsonian National Air and
Space Museum, Douglas DC-3, available at http://www.nasm.si.edu/nasm/aero/aircraft/douglas
_dc3.htm (last visited January 31, 2003).
59. See Edward C. Sweeny, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential?, 19 J. Air L.
166, 169 (1952) (espousing that one out of six planes operating in 1939 was involved in some type
of aviation accident).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A note.
61. See id.
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significant burden.62 While strict liability was still a practical solution for
ground damage, negligence theories gained support for litigation involving
passengers and cargo. 63
2. Negligence
Individuals or entities act negligently if their conduct falls below the
proscribed standard of care.64 Therefore, a negligent party is liable for the
injuries it causes to another. 65 To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant had a duty, the defendant breached the duty,
and the breach was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained.66 The
plaintiff maintains the burden to establish the defendant's liability
throughout the litigation.67
The defendant's duty depends on the variable standard of care adopted
in tort cases. 68 The standard of care can be determined in a myriad of ways.
The legislature can define a particular standard by which an actor's conduct
is measured, or the courts can employ the reasonable person standard. 69
The standard is flexible and depends on the totality of the circumstances. 70
For instance, the weather, available equipment, technology, and known
risks all affect whether an actor's conduct is reasonable in light of the
surrounding circumstances. 71 In the past, weather and technology have
played significant roles in determining the appropriate standard of care for
an air carrier in a given situation. 72 In today's political climate, known risks
may play the same role as an unforeseeable outside occurrence and may
relieve a carrier of liability.73 Therefore, when determining whether an air
62. Id. § 520A cmt. c.
63. Cha, supra note 56, at 160.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 433B.
68. Id. § 285.
69. Id. Defendants are said to act reasonably if their conduct conforms to that of a person
acting reasonably under the same or similar circumstances. Id. § 283.
70. Id. § 283 cmt. c.
71. See id. (stating that whether one's conduct is negligent depends on "the circumstances
under which he must act").
72. See Gatlin, supra note 35, at 863-64 (noting the flexibility of a negligence standard and
that a determination as to reasonableness must be in the context of the same or similar
circumstances).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 289-290 (1965) (noting an air carrier has a
duty to prevent injury to passengers and third parties from risks the carrier knows or should have
known about, but a highly organized terrorist attacks may be undetectable and unpreventable,
limiting a plaintiff's ability to establish a prima facie showing).
2002]
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carrier's conduct was reasonable, one has to evaluate the known risks and
the carrier's subsequent reaction to them.
The application of common law negligence to the aviation industry was
not without its flaws. 74  The plaintiff had to overcome substantial
evidentiary obstacles to establish a prima facie case.75 Due to the cata-
strophic nature of aviation accidents, the burden of proof was difficult to
overcome. 76 The large-scale destruction involved in an airplane crash
obliterates any direct or circumstantial evidence of the carrier's
culpability.77 What physical evidence remains would be arduous and
expensive for the plaintiff to investigate and catalog. 78 The plaintiff would
have to rely on the individual carrier's investigation and subsequent
governmental findings.79 Beyond the large-scale destruction of evidence
and the expense of gathering what remained, the plaintiff would also be
disadvantaged by the carrier's control of the accident scene. 80 All these
issues were magnified in international air crashes. Together these
considerations became considerable stumbling blocks, and required some
type of remediation. This type of remediation came in the form of res ipsa
loquitur.8S
3. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The principle of res ipsa loquitur originated as an evidentiary rule and
evolved into another means by which to assign liability.82 Applying res
ipsa loquitur allows the judge or jury to infer negligence merely by the
occurrence of an event. 83 In aviation accident litigation, res ipsa loquitur
effectively shifts the plaintiff's burden to the defendant.84 As a result, the
plaintiff does not have to establish a prima facie case of negligence. 85
74. See Coblentz, supra note 33, at 651-52 (stating negligence theories were difficult for
plaintiffs to prove due to the condition of the wreckage, lack of witnesses, destruction of physical
evidence, inability to recreate the scene, and the carrier's control of the accident scene).
75. Gatlin, supra note 35, at 868-69.
76. Id. at 867.
77. Coblentz, supra note 33, at 650.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Res ipsa loquitur "provid[es] that, in some circumstances, the mere fact of an accident's
occurrence raises an inference of negligence so as to establish the prima facie case." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (7th ed. 1999).
82. Cha, supra note 56, at 175-83.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
84. Id. cmt. a.
85. Cha, supra note 56, at 174-75. When applying res ipsa loquitur, the defendant must
overcome a rebuttable presumption of negligence created by the fact that the accident occurred.
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Instead, the air carrier must overcome the presumption of negligence with
compelling evidence that it acted reasonably.8 6 This rule is only applied in
a particular set of circumstances that support certain inferences.8 7 The
accident must not ordinarily occur without negligent conduct on the part of
the actor, and the actor must have exclusive control of the instrumentality
that caused the injury.88  The plaintiff must be unable to establish
negligence, and the defendant must be in a superior position to discern the
cause of the injury. 89
Res ipsa loquitur caused significant changes in the aviation industry.
Early on, aviation's "ultra-hazardous" nature justified assigning carriers
strict liability. 90 However, developments in technology and design reduced
the inherent dangers of air transport. 91  The newfound safety and
dependability standards in the aviation industry warranted inferences re-
garding a defendant's negligent conduct.92 A particular set of facts sur-
rounding an air disaster may lead to the inference that the accident would
not have happened but for the defendant's negligence. For example, in
Haasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express,93 a plane flying in good conditions
disappeared.94 Without the wreckage, the plaintiffs were never able to
gather physical evidence and ascertain whether the defendant's role in the
accident was reasonable or negligent. 95  These types of evidentiary
problems were remedied by shifting the plaintiff's responsibility to
establish the prima facie case to the defendant.
Evidentiary remedies eventually gave way to unique procedural
remedies in aviation accident cases. 96 Liability risks greatly affected the
laws governing the assignment of liability and the standard of care expected
in the aviation industry. 97 A unique form of the principle res ipsa loquitur
86. Id. at 177.
87. Id. at 174-75. Res ipsa loquitur only applies in situations that warrant the inference of
negligence or situations which presumably would not have occurred but for negligent conduct. Id.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D.
89. Id. cmt. c.
90. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmt. b (1938).
91. See Howard Osterhout, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Aviation, 2 AIR
L. REV. 9, 10 (1931) (noting that the safety and stability of the aviation industry increased greatly
after World War I, and did not warrant the application of strict liability, which allowed for the use
of negligence principles such as res ipsa loquitur).
92. See id. at 23-24 (noting that most aviation accidents were caused by pilot error, which
allowed for a presumption of pilot negligence).
93. 100 F. Supp. I (D. Alaska 1951).
94. Haasman, 100 F. Supp. at 2.
95. Id.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 328D cmt. h (1965).
97. See generally Ball, supra note 5 (stating the heavy influence of liability risks was
intertwined with the changing face of liability); see also Cha, supra note 56, at 175.
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evolved and created a "special responsibility" that carriers owed to
passengers.98 A distinctive procedural presumption against the carrier was
created, and unless the carrier could establish that it acted reasonably,
liability was assigned.99 The carrier's burden could only be overcome by
showing that the injury was caused by a circumstance beyond its control or
knowledge. 00 This shift in the burden of proof allowed for a recovery
where it was otherwise difficult to prove. A presumption of liability
ensured a recovery similar to the application of strict liability in aviation's
most dangerous days.' 0' While the risk to the public was minimized, the
industry's stability was still in the hands of the courts.'0 2 As a result,
frequent and large damage awards slowed industry growth and
development. 103
Liability limits clearly insulated the aviation industry against unusually
large settlements.10 4 However, unreasonably low limits were too deferential
to the airline industry.105 Courts began to pattern liability after res ipsa
loquitur principles, but balanced the divergent interests with liability
limits.106 Passengers would be ensured a recovery unless air carriers could
overcome the heavy burden of establishing that they were not negligent,
and an atmosphere conducive to aviation growth and development was
possible by limiting recovery.' 07 Without oppressive damage awards, assets
could be used to further technology and not to mitigate liability risks.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D.
99. See Osterhout, supra note 91, at 15 (stating the defendant may point to the plaintiff's or
another third party's negligent conduct and its own reasonable conduct to defeat the presumption
of negligence).
100. Haasman v. Pac. Alaska Air Express, 100 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Alaska 1951).
101. See supra Part I.A.I.
102. Ball, supra note 5, at 52-53 (quoting Hagymasi v. Colonial W. Airways, 1931 U.S. Av.
R. 73 (1931); Foot v. Northwest Airways, 1931 U.S. Av. R. 66 (1931); Williamson v. Curtis-
Wright Flying Serv., 1932 U.S. Av. R. 133 (1932)).
103. Id. at 52.
104. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. 22 (stating that pursuant to the original
draft convention, injured passengers could only receive 125,000 francs).
105. See Daniel Karlin, Warsaw, Hague, The 88th Congress and Limited Damages in
International Air Crashes, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 59, 64-65 (1962) (stating the financial instability
of the aviation industry was exaggerated to the detriment of the passengers and the benefit of the
carriers).
106. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 376-77 (1873); Powell
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 164 S.W. 628, 640-43 (Mo. 1914); Coleman v. Pa. R.R. Co., 89 A. 87, 90-
92 (Pa. 1913); Davis v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 67 N.W. 16, 20 (Wis. 1896)
(recognizing that public policy would not allow air carriers to escape liability completely, the
courts tried to provide the customers with an avenue for recovery and protect the industry from
high liability risks).
107. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 376-77; Powell, 164 S.W. at 640-43; Coleman, 89 A.
at 90-92; Davis, 67 N.W. at 20.
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Based on equity and public policy, the courts upheld reasonable liability
limits when coupled with principles of res ipsa loquitur.108
4. Compulsory Insurance
Compulsory insurance was also earmarked as a solution to the eco-
nomic frailty of the airline industry.109 After a party was assigned liability,
compulsory insurance, or a similar remedial scheme, enabled the liable
party to pay.110 One author stated compulsory insurance allowed the airline
industry to substitute insurance for liability."' There were several ap-
proaches to compulsory insurance and who should be liable for aviation
accidents.12 There were concerns that third party landowners were not
sufficiently participating in the air carriage to warrant responsibility."l 3 If
passengers were responsible for their own coverage, notions of public
policy came into question.114 To an extent, compulsory insurance allowed
the industry to contract away its liability.l15 This contracting away of duties
appeared unreasonable, and therefore, unenforceable.1 6 Lastly, if the
industry bore the entire burden without some type of liability limitation,
insurance premiums threatened to cripple it.117 There was some agreement
that if a comprehensive insurance plan was realized, numerous parties
would have to participate.11 8 In the end, passengers and common carriers
most likely bore the financial burden to provide mandatory insurance
coverage.
Compulsory insurance had several shortcomings. First, some thought
insuring carriers would promote carelessness.]l 9 If carriers knew insurance
providers were available to pick up the check, they could promote an unsafe
108. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 376-77; Powell, 164 S.W. at 640-43; Coleman, 89 A.
at 90-92; Davis, 67 N.W. at 20.
109. See Ball, supra note 5, at 66-67 (noting that if strict liability was imposed on air
carriers, compulsory insurance must be available to help pay the costs of remediation).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 67.
112. See id. at 68-72 (noting one approach was a flat fee for all passengers and another
required passengers to purchase their insurance with the cost included in the ticket fare).
113. Id. at 74.
114. See id. (noting there were concerns compulsory insurance purchased by the passengers
would promote air carrier recklessness, thus insurance companies would choose not to be involved
in a costly premium game because insurance rates would merely rise, creating new problems).
115. Id.
116. Anderson v. Erie R.R. Co., 119 N.E. 557, 558 (N.Y. 1918). The court rejected the
carrier's attempt to have each passenger contract for liability individually. Id.
117. Ball, supra note 5, at 74.
118. See id. at 69-70 (discussing the possibility that parties may contract for liability
limitations, including carriers, third parties, and passengers).
119. Id. at 74.
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and irresponsible attitude. 20 Further, compulsory insurance was not a
viable solution absent liability limits.121 Without limits, carriers would face
the same large-scale liability, and insurance companies would demand
substantial premiums.1 22 While the industry would be insulated to some
degree, the premiums could be equally burdensome.123  Eventually,
premiums would reach unmanageable levels and buckle either the providers
or the insureds. Most importantly, insurance would have had to be
compulsory across the board through either uniform state laws or federal
statutes. 124
Many of these concerns proved timeless. 125 Unusually high liability
risks create financial burdens on dangerous industries.126  Aviation
accidents will always be catastrophic because of the number of casualties
involved. Mandating insurance for any industry with high liability risks
requires a well-organized regulatory scheme.
B. THE USE OF LIABILITY LIMITS TO MITIGATE RISKS
After much debate, liability limits were settled on internationally to
resolve liability issues. 127 Liability limits proved to be the most reliable
means to ensure a fair and equitable recovery without bankrupting the air
carriers.1 28 Limitations on liability supported notions of fairness and
justice. Air carriers were afforded some guarantees in pending aviation
accidents, but were not given free reign.129 The carriers benefited from the
120. Id.
121. See id. (noting insurance premiums would merely escalate if excessive damage awards
were allowed).
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Taking into account an aircraft's ability to cross multiple state lines, a uniform system
governing compulsory insurance would need to be established. Coblentz, supra note 33, at 652-
53.
125. See generally Osterhout, supra note 91. While aviation was still evolving, the high
number of damages suits threatened its existence, and courts were repeatedly faced with the
dilemma of balancing recovery for individuals with the stability of aviation. Id. at 14-17. It was
important to resolve the concerns and apply a uniform recovery theory. Id. at 28.
126. See Lloyd, supra note 14, at 553 (concluding that without aviation accident insurance,
the newly spawned aviation industry would collapse under high liability risks).
127. Coblentz, supra note 33, at 650-53.
128. Ball, supra note 5, at 74.
129. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 376-77 (1873); Powell
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 164 S.W. 628, 640-43 (Mo. 1914); Coleman v. Pa. R.R. Co., 89 A. 87, 90-
92 (Pa. 1913); Davis v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 67 N.W. 16, 20 (Wis. 1896) (noting
public policy would not allow air carriers to escape liability completely, but would provide the
customers with an avenue for recovery and protect the industry from high liability risks).
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limitations, and society benefited from the interesting procedural flip.130
Overall, the burden of proof placed upon the carriers justifiably mitigated
the need for large damage awards.131 Social policy supported liability
limits in favor of a more equitable remedy.132
From its beginning, the aviation industry has played an integral part in
expanding global industrialization. The effect of air transportation on
modem societies is immeasurable. Goods can now be traded over long dis-
tances, people can meet in the far corners of the world, and businesses can
transcend borders. Aviation's positive effects on commerce and culture
were worth protecting in its early, fragile stages of development. Air
carriage is one of the foundations of today's economy and financial
viability. Other influential transportation industries were afforded similar
protections.133
At their inception, liability limits protected the industry without being
too deferential to carriers. 134 Legislators believed limits afforded adequate
protection while ensuring an equitable recovery.135  A plaintiff's
disadvantage in a simple negligence case against major airlines was
mitigated with the use of liability limits. 36 Limits enabled many parties to
come to the table and provide an equitable solution to proof problems
unique to aviation accident cases. 137 Liability limits created value and
incentives for air carriers. 38  Intra-industry agreements reflected the
willingness to bear the shifted burden of proof so long as liability limits
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965) (noting ordinarily the plaintiff
must offer proof of negligence, but in cases where res ipsa loquitur applied, the defendant must
overcome the presumptive burden of negligence).
131. See Cha, supra note 56, at 175-83 (noting that with the implementation of res ipsa
loquitur, plaintiffs were able to recover without a costly showing of negligence, and in return,
their damage awards were reduced).
132. See Ball, supra note 5, at 56 (stating that because of the public's interest in the
continued viability of the aviation industry, strict liability should not be enforced even though
aviation may have been seen as a hazardous endeavor).
133. See Lloyd, supra note 14, at 543-47 (tracing the historical developments of maritime
transport industries, as well as automobiles, and comparing the liability risks to the new aviation
industry).
134. See Bullock, supra note 17, at 414-15 (stressing the aviation industry's inability to grow
without liability limitations, and therefore, it was not unfair deferentialism, but necessity, that
dictated the implementation of limits).
135. Commerce Dept., Aeronautical Division Bulletin No. 18 (Sept. 1, 1929).
136. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, at arts. 20, 22 (creating a presumption of air
carrier liability, but limiting the amount of damages available).
137. See Gatlin, supra note 35, at 867-71 (stating that applying negligence to aviation cases
made it difficult for the plaintiffs to make the prima facie showing in order to bring a cause of
action, and therefore, limited their influence and ability to negotiate with large corporations).
138. See id. at 873-74 (noting a presumption of negligence, or the Convention's contractual
presumption of negligence, created incentives that brought the carriers to the table in good faith).
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were imposed.139 The courts upheld the limits if they were reasonable.14 0
Many in the early twentieth century regarded limits as the most viable
solution to the intricacies of aviation accident litigation.I 1
However, there was not a consensus regarding the utility of liability
limits. Some believed the limits were unfairly deferential to the aviation
industry and, as a result, did not achieve goals fundamental to the judicial
system.142 These critics thought that allowing an industry to contract away
costly damages created a dangerous precedent.143 They claimed liability
limits employed the judicial system to protect the private industry,Inn
allowed the air carriers to act irresponsibly,145 and favored the aviation
industry over the general public. 146 Further, these critics thought the
aviation industry was strong enough to absorb costs just like any other
viable industry.147 They felt legislated liability limits created predictable
recoveries that would destroy the preventative aspects in awarding damages
because large judgments promoted industry responsibility and
dependability. 148
Critics of liability limits continually noted the air of impropriety and
the potential for abuse as main concerns. 149 Unfortunately, there was not a
viable alternative. Compulsory insurance was dismissed as ultimately
impracticable.150 The international community favored liability limits after
years of intense debate,15 1 and discussions about adopting them began very
early in aviation history. 152 The International Convention of Air Navigation
139. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 40, at 5 (stating the aviation industry looked favorably on
the presumption of liability coupled with liability limitations).
140. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 373 (1873); Allen, supra
note 52, at 328.
141. Bullock, supra note 17, at 414-15; John C. Cooper, Jr., Rules of Aircraft Liability in the
Proposed Federal Merchant Airship Act, 2 AIR L. REV. 327, 347 (1931); Arnold W. Knauth,
Limitation of Aircraft Owners' Liability, 3 AIR. L. REV. 135, 140-41 (1932).
142. Allen, supra note 52, at 327-28.
143. See Karlin, supra note 105, at 59 (noting that limitations would make the passenger
responsible for the carrier's negligence).
144. Id.
145. Allen, supra note 52, at 328-29.
146. Id.
147. See Karlin, supra note 105, at 65 (quoting H. Drion for the proposition that the United
States aviation industry was second to none and did not need limited liability in order to survive).
148. See Allen, supra note 52, at 329 (discussing the possibility that carriers would act
irresponsibly if absolved of liability and determining that large judgments created an incentive to
act with care and caution).
149. Id.; Karlin, supra note 105, at 59.
150. See supra Part II.A.4. To date, insurance is not mandated, but economic realities drive
carriers to provide for adequate resources in the event of a catastrophic accident.
151. Muller, supra note 54, at 236.
152. See id. at 235 (noting that the International Convention of Air Navigation, CINA, met in
October of 1919 to discuss air carrier liability and briefly discussed compulsory insurance).
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(CINA) was held in October of 1919 and marked the beginning of the
decade-long debate concerning liability limits, which peaked with the
Warsaw Convention of 1929.153 Subsequent amendments followed, but
they merely modified the Warsaw limitation amounts. 154
III. THE WARSAW CONVENTION OF 1929
The Warsaw Convention of 1929 (Convention) applied to common
carriers engaged in the international transport of passengers and goods
between signatory states. 155 The Convention created a statutory scheme by
which plaintiffs were almost ensured a recovery.156 Under the Convention,
air carriers were held to a procedural presumption similar to strict liability,
but were afforded favorable recovery guidelines.157 To obtain a limited
recovery, injured plaintiffs did not bear the heavy burden of establishing
negligence.158 Instead, plaintiffs only had to show willful misconduct if
they sought damages that exceeded the limitation guidelines. 159
The Convention outlined rules governing passenger and luggage ticket
information, the rights of all contracting parties, and, most notably, notice
of imposed liability limits.160 The Convention also created the presumption
of negligence on behalf of the international common carrier. 161 Article 20
stated, "The carrier is not liable if it proves it took all the necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him to take such
measures as to avoid the damage." 62 The Convention heightened the
common law tort, negligence standard.1 63 Air carriers were not merely
required to act with ordinary care, but were required to act with the most
153. Id. at 235-36.
154. Protocol To Amend The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage By Air, signed at Warsaw (1929), as amended by The Protocol Done at the
Hague (1955) (on file with author) [hereinafter The Hague].
155. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. 1.
156. See id. art. 20 (providing that carriers are presumed responsible unless they can prove
they took all the necessary steps reasonably available to avoid an accident).
157. See id. art. 22 (stating that the liability limit was limited to 125,000 francs per injured
passenger and 250 francs for each kilogram of goods or luggage).
158. See id. art. 17 (presuming carrier liability unless the carrier could demonstrate it took all
necessary steps to protect against injury).
159. See Ian D. Midgley, Note, You'll Love the Way We Fly--But if You Don't, Too Bad!:
Does Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Offer Hope of Subjecting Reckless International Airlines to
Punitive Damages?, 48 CASE W. RES. 73, 75 (1997) (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 20,
art. 25).
160. See generally Warsaw Convention, supra note 20.
161. Id. art. 17.
162. Id. art. 20.
163. See id. (stating the carriers, acting as defendants, have the burden to overcome a
presumption of negligence).
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reasonable care. 164 The carriers could only escape liability if they proved
that they acted in the most reasonable manner exercising all necessary
precautions to ensure no injuries. 65 With the ratification of the Warsaw
Convention, steps were finally taken to unify international rules on air
carriage. 166 Many saw the Convention as a triumph for the aviation
industry and essential to its success. 167 However, the debate on liability
limits intensified. 168
IV. LIABILITY LIMITS TODAY
The assignment of aviation accident liability to passengers and third
parties on the ground has changed significantly through the years.
Originally, aviation's ultra-hazardous nature created strict liability for air
carriers. 169  As aircraft and engineering progressed, casualties and
equipment damage decreased. The need to hold the airlines strictly liable
subsided, and something more than mere negligence emerged. 7 0 Air car-
riers were charged to take all the precautions necessary to ensure a safe
flight with no injuries.' 7' Variations of res ipsa loquitur solved difficult
evidentiary and procedural difficulties.172 The development, and
subsequent withdrawal, of liability limits was the most important change.173
Originally created to protect the fledgling industry, liability limits were
eventually terminated domestically with voluntary private agreements, but
they remain internationally.17 4
164. See id. (noting the carriers must establish that they took all the steps necessary and not
merely the reasonable steps available).
165. Id.
166. See generally id. (stating the Convention was formally termed the "Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air").
167. See generally Alexander N. Sack, International Uniformity of Private Law Rules on Air
Transportation and the Warsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. REV. 345 (1933); Kaftal, supra note 25
(discussing the evolution of the aviation industry and noting the positive impact of the liability
limitations established).
168. See generally Allen, supra note 52; Karlin, supra note 105 (pointing out the negative
impacts of the Warsaw Convention, such as carrier irresponsibility, escape of liability, and
legislation too deferential to the aviation industry).
169. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. h (1965).
171. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. 20.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. h.
173. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. 22; International Air Law Conference:
Legal & Corporate Secretary, Montreal Convention 1999, available at http://www.iata.org/legal/
dep-subpage.asp?department.html.
174. Muller, supra note 54, at 236.
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The Warsaw Convention of 1929 was the first international agreement
outlining a remedial scheme that limited air carrier liability.175 Early on,
the United States had reservations about the low limits. 76 The Convention
was not adopted by the United States until 1934.177 There was never clear
support for liability limits, and the debate continued at The Hague in
1955.178 Still dissatisfied with the low liability limits, the United States did
not ratify the Hague Protocol. 7 9 Liability limitations were addressed in
four subsequent meetings, dubbed the "Montreal Protocols."' 8 0 In 1999, the
International Air Transportation Association (IATA) and International Civil
Aviation Organization negotiated a private inter-carrier agreement that
finally survived United States scrutiny.181 The air carriers stipulated to a
two-fold recovery scheme. Air carriers were strictly liable for damages up
to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)182 or approximately
$135,000.183 However, the individual plaintiffs could recover for the
amount of damages without limitation if they claimed the air carrier acted
negligently.184 Therefore, the air carriers retained the burden to establish
they did not act negligently, just as stipulated in the Warsaw Convention of
1929, but the need to show malicious intent was removed. As a result, the
need for a good insurance underwriter intensified without practical liability
limits. 185
Prior to September 11, domestic and international air carriers generally
insured the hull, passengers, third parties, and structures on the ground. 86
International carriers routinely extended their coverage to include war risk
175. Id.; Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, arts. 20-22. The first international aviation
convention was held on October 13, 1919, and led to the Warsaw Convention in 1929, which was
the first convention to adopt an international liability scheme. Muller, supra note 54, at 235-36.
176. Warsaw Convention of 1929, art. 22. Originally, liability limits were stipulated at
125,000 francs, or $8300. Id.; The Hague, supra note 154; J.C. Batra, Modernization of the
Warsaw System - Montreal 1999, 65 J. AIR L. & CoM. 429, 429 (2000).
177. Marshall, supra note 28, at 338.
178. Batra, supra note 176, at 431.
179. The Hague, supra note 154.
180. Batra, supra note 176, at 432.
181. Id. at 442.
182. Special Drawing Rights were incorporated as "a unit of exchange for the [franc]." Id. at
432.
183. Id. at 441.
184. Id. at 442.
185. See Ball, supra note 5, at 66 (stating that "insurance is the answer to the ... problem
created by absolute liability").
186. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Crisis Management Toward Restoring Confidence in Air
Transport-Legal and Commercial Issues, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 595, 610 (2002).
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protection. 87 Although, in hindsight, the coverage was grossly inadequate,
and domestic carriers did not necessarily carry such supplemental plans. 188
V. TERRORISM AND THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
AVIATION INDUSTRY
A. SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE RECENT CRISIS
The strength of the aviation industry is integral to a healthy overall
economy.189 The industry supports numerous sub-industries, such as
restaurants, lodges, merchants, and tourism opportunities.190 Air travel is
an immeasurable asset to today's businessperson. Aviation in general has
incredible positive effects on the nation's economy and culture. The events
of September 11 will have long-lasting effects on the aviation industry and
should catalyze a renewed support for liability limitations. The destruction
and loss of life as a result of September 11 was immense, and the overall
damage exceeded $5 billion.191 The carriers directly involved in the events
surrounding September 11 were seriously impacted, as were peripheral
airlines. 192
Over 3000 individuals lost their lives during the September 11 terrorist
attacks. 193 In total, two structures were decimated, and four airliners,
American Airlines (American) flights 11 and 77 and United flights 93 and
175, crashed with passengers on board. These numbers do not factor in the
countless individuals injured from falling debris and similar hazards. There
was also a disastrous effect on the economic health of the country.
Immediately following the attacks, all air transports were grounded and
airports were closed for four days. 194 The closures were incredibly costly.
Not only did the grounding cost air carriers billions, it created a significant
ripple effect. The Joint Economic Committee estimated that there was a
187. See id. at 599-610 (stating that insurers cancelled war risk insurance after September
11).
188. Paul Mann, Congress Worried About Terrorism Insurance Void, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., June 3, 2002, at 39, available at http://www.avaitionnow.com.
189. H.R. 2891, To Preserve The Continued Viability of The United States Air
Transportation System, 107th Cong. 45, 22 (2001) (statement by Ms. Brown of Florida).
190. Id.
191. Hearing on S. 1450 before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Leo F. Mullin, CEO Delta Air Lines),
available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/fullchearings/09-19-01/mullin.html [hereinafter
Mullin].
192. Id.
193. Mary Beth Casper, Quilt Pieces Together Images of Lives Lost, Newsday, July 11,
2002, at B2.
194. Mullin, supra note 191.
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$40 billion to $70 billion economic loss directly attributable to the terrorist
activity that took place on September 11.195 Insurance underwriters paid
out billions in claims.196 Most air carriers were devastated by the low
passenger carriage rates directly following September 11. The slow
passenger return exacerbated the financial woes of an already depressed
industry. 197
Estimates of laid off workers toppled the hundred thousand mark.198
Even worse, many workers were terminated without the usual severance
packages routinely offered at other times.199 In an attempt to curb costs and
avoid bankruptcy, many carriers minimized the number of payouts from
pension funds and severance packages. 200 Some estimates calculated that
pension funds were as much as $12 billion in the red for the seven major
carriers. 201 Needless to say, many carriers teetered on the edge of viability
in the days and months following September 11. Eventually, U.S. Airways
and United Airlines (United) filed for bankruptcy because of their
performance after September 1 1.202 The aviation industry relapsed to its
precarious position in the early twentieth century.203  Once again,
uncertainty plagues the future of one of America's most vital industries.
The utility of liability limits was once essential to the sustainability of the
aviation industry, and in light of today's political climate, may need to be
revisited.
B. GOVERNMENTAL REMEDIAL MEASURES
Eleven days after the September 11 attacks, the United States
government passed legislation to bolster the viability of the aviation
195. Mann, supra note 188, at 39.
196. Kimberly Johnson, Airports: Airports Regain Wartime Insurance, At A Higher Price,
AVIATION WEEK'S AIRPORT, Oct. 3, 2001, available at http://www.aviationnow.com. American
International Group estimated a total payout of $20 billion. Id.
197. Jim Ott, Signs of April Revenue Decline Darken Airline Outlook, May 6, 2002,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., available at http://aviationnow.com.
198. James R. Asker, Unions See A 'Slap' To Laid-off Workers, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Oct. 1, 2001, at 40, available at http://www.aviationnow.com.
199. Id.
200. James Ott, Pension Plans Suffer From Terrorist Fallout, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., June 10, 2002, available at http://www.aviationnow.com
201. Id.
202. U.S. Airways Declares Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at Al, available at
http://www.airsafetyonline.com; Keith L. Alexander & Sara Kehaulani Goo, Expect a Bad Year,
Airlines Tell Senate, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at El.
203. See Kaftal, supra note 25, at 157 (noting that in its infancy, the aviation industry was
seriously compromised by potentially bankrupting liability created by high death rates, which is
similar to today's liability risks created by highly organized terrorist attacks with the potential to
kill thousands of people in one incident).
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industry. 204 The legislation provided aid on three major fronts. First, it
offered relief in the form of federal grants and loan guarantees to qualified
carriers.205 Second, the federal government assumed some liability for
damages incurred by third parties on the ground. 206 Finally, the legislation
addressed the precarious state of aviation war risk insurance immediately
following the attacks. 207 Congress and the White House quickly agreed on
the legislation, and termed it the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act (Act).208 Many felt the aviation industry could not recover
without such federal aid.209
The Act provided relief for the aviation industry in the form of $5
billion in grant allowances and another $10 billion in loan guarantees. 2 10
The federal grants were intended to reimburse carriers for losses directly
attributable to the terrorist attacks on September 11.211 Airport closures and
interruptions in flight schedules created significant hardships on all the
operating carriers. 212 The federal aid was intended to stabilize the air
transportation industry for losses incurred between September 11, 2001, and
December 31, 2001.213
Loan guarantees, or Federal Credit Instruments, were also approved to
bolster the viability of the air transport industry. 21 4 The Act created an Air
Transport Stabilization Board (Board) with the power to approve loan
guarantees and extend federal credit. 215 In essence, the guarantees obligate
the federal government to pay a pre-arranged percentage of the debt if an
approved carrier is unable to fulfill its primary obligation.21 6 The Board
204. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (Supp.
2002).
205. See id. sec. 101 (providing aviation disaster relief).
206. See id. sec. 401 (providing a September 11 th victims compensation fund).
207. 49 U.S.C. §§ 44302-44303 (Supp. 2002).
208. See S. 1450, 107th Cong. (2001) (representing a federal aid package introduced by Mr.
Daschle for himself and Mr. Lott); H.R. 2926, 107th Cong. (2001) (representing a federal aid
package introduced by House Representative Young from Alaska); President George W. Bush, Jr.,
Address to The Nation (Nov. 2001), reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. D35. The President
highlighted the need to "come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying with direct
assistance during this emergency." President George W. Bush, Jr., Address to The Nation (Nov.
2001).
209. E.g., Bush, supra note 208.
210. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 sec. 101(a)(1)-(2).
211. See id. sec. 101 (a)(2) (stating the intent to compensate air carriers for up to $5 billion of
losses incurred as a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11).
212. Mullin, supra note 191.
213. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 sec. 101.
214. See id. sec. 102(b) (authorizing the Air Transportation Stabilization Board to enter into
loan agreements with qualified and approved applicants).
215. Id. sec. 102.
216. Id.
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established three minimum requirements for carriers to secure a
government-backed loan:
(1) the borrower is an air carrier for which credit is not reasonably
available at the time of transaction; (2) the intended obligation by
the borrower is prudently incurred; and (3) such an agreement is a
necessary part of maintaining a safe, efficient, and viable
commercial aviation system in the United States. 2 17
While the Board promulgated flexible guidelines, not all carriers that
applied were approved, and only America West has been approved to
date. 218
America West was one of the five carriers to request a loan guarantee
in the past several months.2 19 Reportedly, it lost more than $100 million in
the third quarter directly following the four-day airport closures. 220 But,
loan guarantees significantly changed its financial outlook, and
demonstrated their necessity to ensure a strong financial future for the
airlines.221 In the week following its federal credit instrument approval,
America West's stock rose sixty percent. 222
U.S. Airways and United Airlines also hoped to cash in on the loan
guarantees and revitalize their portfolios. 223 U.S. Airways requested a $900
million guarantee on a $1 billion loan, which has been conditionally
approved. 224 United requested a $1.8 billion guarantee on a $2 billion
loan.225 The latter application was denied because there was not a
"reasonable assurance" the loan would be paid back.226 This did not bode
well for United, which was forced to declare bankruptcy.227 Any federal
loan guarantee that hinges approval on repayment capability could be
devastating for a carrier facing unlimited liability. While United's future is
217. 14 C.F.R. § 1300.10 (2002).
218. David Bond, United, US Airways Put Loan Guarantees to Test, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., July 1, 2002, at 39, available at http://www.aviationnow.com.
219. Id. The carriers include America West, United Airlines, US Airways, Vanguard
Airlines, and Frontier Flying Service. Id.
220. Jim Ott, Expenses Flat, America West Still Dealt A $100 Million Operating Loss,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 31, 2001, available at http://www.aviationnow.com.
221. Steve Lott, America West Stock Soars Thanks to Loan Guarantees, AVIATION DAILY,
Jan. 3, 2002, available at http://www.aviationnow.com.
222. Id.
223. See Bond, supra note 218, at 39 (noting both companies submitted applications to the
Air Transportation Stabilization Board).
224. Michelle Maynard, US Airways to Cut Costs $1.8 Billion a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
2002, at 39.
225. Bond, supra note 218, at 39.
226. Id.
227. See sources cited supra note 202.
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uncertain, it was, at the very least, given reprieve from exorbitant liability to
third parties. 228 In a climate with no federal aid, inadequate war risk
insurance, and high liability risks, securing loans could be close to
impossible.
The liability incurred by United Airlines contributed to its bankruptcy
filing, and American Airlines faces mounting debts of bankrupting
proportions. 229 There were also fears for airlines not directly tied to the
events of September 11.230 Congress approved aid packages that benefited
more than just American Airlines and United Airlines.231 However, United
and American's exposure to large-scale liability agitated an already perilous
situation. While the air carrier market crumbled, the carriers directly
involved with the hijackings faced additional liability pressures. Surely, the
burden would have been too much to bear without government
assistance. 232
The implications for the global economy are clear. Terrorists
demonstrated that they could successfully disrupt the United States, or any
other nation's, economy by using airplanes in a string of well-planned
attacks with high casualties. Aviation's significant effect on world
commerce warrants protection against such acts. Immediately following
September 11, the federal government assisted United Airlines and
American Airlines in compensating victims of the attacks. 233  The
September 11th Victims Compensation Fund of 2001 (Fund) allowed
injured third parties compensation through a revolving federal fund,234 and
protected the air carriers dangerously exposed to potentially fatal
liability. 235 The Fund provided compensation for economic and non-
economic losses of individuals present at the World Trade Center, the
228. 49 U.S.C. 44302(b)(2) (Supp. 2002), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002) (providing that carriers which were victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11 were
not liable to third parties on the ground).
229. See Johnson, supra note 196.
230. H.R. 2891, To Preserve the Continued Viability of the United States Air Transportation
System, and on the Financial Condition of the Airline Industry in the Aftermath of the Events
Which Occurred on Tuesday, September 11, 2001, Hearing on H.R. 2891 before the House
Comm. On Transportation and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Scott C. Gibson,
Senior Vice President and Managing Officer, SH&E, Inc.); Mullin, supra note 191 (testimony of
Leo F. Mullin, Chairman and CEO, Delta Airlines) (testifying about the wide array of
repercussions affecting the entire domestic aviation industry).
231. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101, 44302-44303 (Supp. 2002).
232. Mullin, supra note 191. In addition to airport shutdowns and general industry woes,
carriers directly involved in the events of September 11, 2001, faced large-scale liability to third
persons on the ground. Id.
233. 49 U.S.C. § 40101.
234. 49 U.S.C. § 44307 (2000).
235. 49 U.S.C. § 40101. sec. 401.
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Pentagon, the Shanksville, Pennsylvania crash site, and passengers or crew
aboard any of the four hijacked airplanes.236 The Special Master in charge
of deciding compensatory amounts was directed not to take negligence into
account.237
The federal government also set explicit liability limits for air
carriers.238 Liability was limited up to the amount of the insurance
coverage held by the carrier at the time of the terrorist attacks.239 While the
record is scant, and the legislation was passed hurriedly, one can infer that
the limits were established to insulate the carriers from potentially
bankrupting liability risks. Permanent liability limitations on a global level
would achieve the same goals. The global air transportation industry is
particularly vulnerable to liability risks, especially in today's political
climate where airplanes are being used as deadly weapons. Liability
limitations could save whole nations from economic collapse.
Immediately following September 11, three major insurance carriers
repealed their war risk coverage. 240 Most insurance underwriter contracts
included clauses allowing underwriters to rescind coverage with seven days
notice, or within a comparable period. 241 When coverage was finally
renewed, it was reinstated with significantly inflated premiums.2 42
Estimates of increases in unpredictable war risk insurance premiums ranged
from 300% to 2500%.243 Congressional findings echoed industry concerns
that insurance coverage was critical to economic growth, urban
development, the construction and maintenance of public and private
housing, and the promotion of United States exports and foreign trade in an
increasingly interconnected world. 244 Further, any lack of insurance could
236. Id. sec. 405.
237. Id. sec. 405(b)(2).
238. 49 U.S.C. § 44302(b)(2), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
239. 49 U.S.C. § 44302.
240. Kerry Lynch, U.S. Companies Scramble for War Risk Protection, BUSINESS &
COMMERCIAL AVIATION, Sept. 27, 2001, available at http://www.aviationnow.com.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See To Preserve the Continued Viability of the United States Air Transportation System,
anJ on the Financial Condition of the Airline Industry in the Aftermath of the Events Which
Occurred on Tuesday, September 11, 2001, Hearing on H.R. 2891 Before the House Comm. on
Transportation and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (noting airline
insurance premiums were expected to rise from five cents per passenger to $1.25 per passenger);
see also Mann, supra note 188, at 39 (stating prior to September 11, 2001, $6 million provided
$1.5 billion in coverage, compared to after September 11, where premiums of $7.5 million
provided $70 million in coverage); Jim Ott, Regionals Get Price Break From FAA War Risk
Formula, June 18, 2002, available at http://www.aviationnow.com (noting that from September
11, 2001, until June 18, 2002, insurance premiums rose 300%).
244. H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. (2001).
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seriously undermine the aviation industry's ability to sustain itself in the
future. Without immediate governmental action, the aviation industry faced
a difficult period of uncertainty that would have surely scared away
investors and slowed industry growth.
Fortunately, the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act addressed this concern. Under the Act, the federal government
statutorily agreed to reimburse carriers for insurance premium increases
directly following September 11, 2001, for coverage already paid through
October 1, 2001.245 In addition to insulating the industry from reactionary
rate increases, Congress alleviated insurance underwriters of liability in
excess of $100 million to third parties injured on September 11.246
Together, these measures were designed to stabilize unpredictably high
premiums.247 After the hijackings and the subsequent attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, domestic and international carriers sought
war risk coverage. 248  War risk coverage is essential to the growth and
development of air carriers who wish to ensure their future viability.2 49
Without this coverage, air carriers are not insulated from potentially
bankrupting damage awards. However, insurance underwriters will never
be able to provide affordable coverage without reasonable liability
limitations. 250 Because insurance is a critical factor in the overall equation
to help resolve the current air crisis, 5 1 liability limits must be considered.
VI. LIABILITY LIMITS REVISITED
Airlines, as opposed to passengers or third parties, are in the best
position to shoulder the risks. Carriers and those engaged in flight are
rightfully the parties to assume their respective portion of liability.
However, such a liability scheme places the airlines in a precarious posi-
tion. While they are in the best position to shoulder the burden, no one
party can possibly bear the enormous liability risks associated with air
245. 49 U.S.C. § 44302(b)(1) (Supp. 2002).
246. Id. § 44303.
247. See Hearings, supra note 243 (recognizing extreme insurance premium inflation when
considering a stabilization package); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44302 (providing carriers
reimbursement for insurance cost increases with respect to a premium for coverage ending before
October 1, 2002).
248. See Hearings, supra note 243.
249. See H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. (2001) (listing the Congressional findings and purpose).
250. See generally Hearings, supra note 243 (noting there were concerns the aviation
industry would be bankrupted by liability, and insurance providers quickly revoked war risk
insurance; a presumption can be made that the withdrawal of coverage was due in part to the hefty
claims).
251. See id. (noting insurance providers are not willing to extend coverage without some
type of financial guarantees).
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travel in light of recent terrorist events. Once again, airlines are in a
vulnerable position that mirrors their troubles more than three-quarters of a
century ago. 252 In the early days, technical and equipment shortfalls posed
a grave risk to the public.2 53 Today, the risk is created by well-planned and
intentional catastrophic air disasters. Regardless of the cause, the aviation
industry may not be able to shoulder the large liability risks
economically.2 54
Recently, enacted federal legislation demonstrated air carrier's vulnera-
bility to high liability risks and the need to once again protect this
invaluable industry.2 55  The Air. Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act merely re-created liability protections afforded by early
international agreements such as the Warsaw Convention.2 56 Most notably,
the recent legislation achieved the two goals of early liability agreements.
First, the governmental regulation ensured that injured parties would be
compensated, and second, it protected an industry vulnerable to high
liability risks.257
The passengers and crew aboard the hijacked airliners, as well as
injured third parties on the ground, are able to recover by merely
demonstrating their losses in respect to September 11.258 If a party was
compensated through the Victims Compensation Fund, negligence was
irrelevant.2 5 9 Just as in early aviation accident cases, the traditional negli-
gence standards of proof heavily burdened the injured parties' ability to
establish a prima facie case.2 60 The crashes on September 11 completely
obliterated the World Trade Center's twin towers and four airlines, and
severely damaged the Pentagon. The crash sites in New York City;
Shanksville, Pennsylvania; and Washington, D.C., were quickly barricaded.
Government and industry investigators retained sole control over the sites.
Surely, the injured parties' limited access to the sites created a significant
obstacle to recovering evidence. However, if the passengers, crew, and
252. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
253. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
254. See generally Hearings, supra note 243 (noting there were concerns the aviation
industry would be bankrupted by the liability and airplane groundings directly resulting from the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon).
255. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101, 44302-44303 (Supp. 2002).
256. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. 22 (providing that liability was limited to
125,000 francs for passenger injury).
257. GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 40, at 5.
258. 49 U.S.C. § 40101.
259. Id. sec. 405(c)(3)(B).
260. See Coblentz, supra note 33, at 652 (stating evidentiary obstacles such as lack of
physical evidence and carrier control of the wreckage present significant hardship on the plaintiff
trying to establish a prima facie case of negligence).
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injured third parties had been unable to recover due to evidentiary
problems, an injustice would have occurred. To alleviate this dilemma, the
Victims Compensation Fund expressly omitted a negligence standard and
ensured a recovery for injured parties.
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act also
created protections to ensure the longevity and vitality of the aviation
industry. 261 Recognizing the incredible positive influence the aviation
industry has on the United States economy and global commerce, Congress
quickly adopted short-term protection programs. The legislation addressed
air carrier liability on two fronts. First, the Victims Compensation Fund
directly limited the amount of recovery to the carriers' maximum allowance
under their war risk coverage on September 1 1.262 Participants in the Fund
could not be compensated for losses over the policy limits. 263 Therefore,
the carriers directly involved in the hijackings were given a reprieve from
unpredictably high damage awards that threatened to destroy their ability to
compete in the marketplace. Second, the federal government agreed to
compensate third parties who chose not to seek compensation through the
Fund.264 The federal government assumed responsibility for recoveries
over and above $100 million.265 Therefore, regardless of whether injured
third parties chose to exercise their rights under the Fund or through legal
action, the government effectively insulated the aviation industry from
crippling liability awards.
VII. CONCLUSION
Without the necessary government funding and protections in place,
Capitol Hill was frantic immediately following September 11. Temporary
regulations allowed the aviation industry to escape liability risks too great
for any one industry to bear. However, the terrorist threats are not short-
term, and more permanent solutions are needed. Air carriers around the
globe are in financial disarray from the events that occurred on September
11. The financial crisis in the air transport industry has sent shock waves
throughout the entire economy. Over one hundred thousand United States
261. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44101, 44302-44303 (providing loan guarantees, reimbursement for
insurance increases, and recovery for third parties on the ground, which helped absorb the
bankrupting financial crisis and insulate the aviation industry to ensure its survival).
262. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 sec. 408(a)(1).
263. Id.
264. 49 U.S.C. § 40303.
265. 49 U.S.C. § 44303 sec. 201(b).
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workers in the aviation industry were laid off.266 More layoffs are sure to
come unless there is an upward trend in the near future. The future of
America's aviation industry is plagued with uncertainty. Future financial
stability is essential to ensure the aviation industry endures.
Liability limitations offer a predictable recovery scheme that will not
deter potential investors. In addition, liability limitations will bring down
the price of war risk insurance. Liability limitations may be the solution to
ensure the aviation industry's future, while sharing the international risk
associated with terrorism. Without limitations, the liability risks are great
and will require government patchwork solutions in any future crisis.
Additionally, a new Warsaw-type convention will send a clear message to
terrorists that legitimate governments will not let terrorist acts destroy an
essential element of the world's economies. Without some form of
standardized liability limitation that protects the airlines and society,
aviation's vulnerable financial outlook, coupled with high liability risks,
will surely destroy one of the world's great industries. International
liability limits allow injured parties redress without bankrupting vital
commercial institutions. Liability limitations lost their need and rationale in
a stable and prosperous world, but in an age of terrorist acts, liability
limitations are as important as they were more than three-quarters of a
century ago. Without liability limits, efficient operations of air
transportation may be too costly to survive.
266. See generally Hearings, supra note 243 (projecting nearly one hundred thousand
workers would be laid off as a direct result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001).
2002]

